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AppearanceA
are
important
IN BRIEF
Is Independence in the Eye of the Beholder?
Tlie appearance of independence is an
important facet of the regulation of auditor
independence. The authors conducted a
research study to gauge how some financial
statement users—loan officers—view and ^
make decisions based on loan proposals that
present various types of relationsliips between ' ;
the applicant, the auditor that performs the
external audit, and the auditor that performs i
the internal audit function (whether per- . :
formed in-house or otitsourced to the hypo- .^
thetical loan applicant's external auditor). 4
The results are insightful: The closer the f
relationship between the external auditor and ^
the audit client, the higher the perception of f
inappropriateness, and the less likely the loan ''^
officer is to approve the application. The find-
ings support the current direction of discus-
sion about auditor independence rules, and
the authors draw thoughtful conclusions
about their study's wider implications.
Outsourced
Internal Audit Services
and the Perception
of Auditor
Independence
BY MARSHALL A. GEIGER,
D. JORDAN LOWE, AND
KURT j . PAN Y
In the early
1990s, CPA firms began to view internal
audit activities as an expanding service for
both new and existing clients. Many large
CPA firms had created their own business
units to market and deliver internal audit out-
sourcing services. Many believe such ser-
vices are a natural extension of the external
auditor's work (eg., calling it extended
audit services') and believe that the external
auditors' performance of internal audit-relat-
ed activities may improve audit quality by
providing external auditors with consider-
able knowledge about the client, its opera-
tions, and its industry: The greater the exter-
nal auditor's insight into the client, the better
its ability to understand business transactions
and identify key audit risks.
As CPA firms became more involved in
internal audit outsourcing, independence
The findings indicate that the type of
internal audit outsourcing relationship
affects financial statement users' per-
ceptions and decisions.
issues arose over the propriety of per-
forming both the internal and external
audit functions for the same company.
The SEC has expressed concern that this
relationsliip may create a mutuality of
interests" between the auditor and their
client that could impair independence,
Tlie argument is that auditors are at risk
of acting too much like company man-
agement, which could impair tlieir inde-
pendence or at least the appearance of
independence. Accordingly, in 2000 the
SEC passed regulations to limit the
amount of these services external audi-
tors can render to financial statement
audit clients. In the wake of the Etiron
investigation, the AICPA has called for a
moratorium on these services for pub-
licly traded audit clients.
The Institute of Internal Auditors
(HA) believes that a clear conflict of
interest exists when the CPA firm that
performs the external audit also has pri-
mary responsibility for the internal
audit. The IIA asserts that under such
an arrangement the CPA firm bect)mes
an indirect advocate of management
assertions in the financial statements,
thus possibly predisposing external
auditors to serve corporate manage-
ment rather than shareholders and
investors.
The A1(;PA explicitly addressed this
issue and set forth guidelines in its
Interpretation 101-13 under Rule of
Conduct 101, Extended Audit Services.
This interpretation supercedes the
AICPA s Ethics RuUng 97 and sets forth
parameters as to when and how such
internal control-related services are
allowable under professional standards
while maintaining the external audi
tor s independence. The interpretation
states that independence would not be
considered impaired if "the member or
his or her firm does not act or does not
appear ro act iii a capacity equivalent to
a member of client management or as
an employee."
Despite these guidelines and assur-
ances, regulators remain concerned
that the AICPA's guidance will not alle-
viate potential independence prob-
lems; these fears have been fueled by
high-profile accoimting failures, includ-
ing the Enron bankruptcy. Some sug-
gest creating an additional safeguard to
require a distinct separation of the indi-
viduals within the CPA firm that per-
form the external and internal audit
work. Separating the CPA engagement
teams that provide internal audit ser-
vices from those that provide financial
statement audits may strengthen public
confidence that the (independent)
external audit function is not influ-
enced by other relationships. While
some communication between these
two groups is inevitable and necessary,
financial statement users may perceive
that this team approach does not
impair auditor independence. In fact,
some firms (e.g., Deloitte & Touche)
had already implemented this separate
teams" approach.
The Study
Little evidence exists as to whether
financial statement users believe that
auditor independence or financial state-
ment reliability is jeopardized when the
external auditors are engaged to per-
form internal audit activities. The
objective of this study is to begin to
provide the profession, and regulators,
with some empirical evidence. The
study examined financial statement
users' perceptions and reactions to
varying types of internal audit relation-
ships between CPAs and their audit and
non-audit clients.
Participants. Eight hundred loan
officers from across the United States
were randomly selected from a com-
mercially obtained mailing list. Each
loan officer was mailed the appropriate
case, and a second request for response
mailed approximately three weeks
later. A total of l45 usable responses
were received. The respondents had an
average of 17 years of loan experience.
Case materials. We mailed each
participant a set of materials consisting
of a cover letter, a brief loan-case sce-
nario, financial statements with select-
ed ratios, and a questionnaire. The task
required the loan officers to review a
loan application (from a regional gro-
cery store), evaluate external auditor
independence, assess the reliability of
the historical financial statements, and
make a loan decision. The financial
information included three years" state-
ments of earnings, statements of finan-
cial position, and summaries of cash
flows, and one year's forecasted state-
ments. The purpose of the loan was to
finance expansion into new locations.
The materials also included a brief sum-
mary of company management. The
financial statements were constructed
using industry data reported by Robert
Morris Associates, The financial infor-
mation was depicted as slightly below
industry averages, to allow some uncer-
tainty about whether a loan should be
granted.
The loan proposals were identical
except for the outsourcing arrange-
ment. Four different outsourcing
arrangements were used:
• Not outsourced: The company's
internal auditors performed the internal
audit function. This group served as a
baseline.
• Outsourced^management func-
tions: The internal audit ftmction was
outsourced to the company's external
auditor. In addition, the CPA firm also
performed some of the company's man-
agement functions (not allowed under
Interpretation 101-13 under Rule of
Conduct 101).
• Outsourced—same personnel: The
internal audit function was outsourced
to the company's external auditor. The
same personnel that performed the
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external audit also performed the out-
sourced internal audit activities.
• Outsourced—different personnel:
The internal audit function was out-
sourced to the company's external
auditor. Different personnel within the
firm performed the external audit and
the outsourced internal audit activities.
Ca5e Questions
The AICPA suggests that indepen-
dence-related research should analyze
issues related to confidence in the inde-
pendence of auditors, perceptions of
financial statement accuracy and relia-
bility, and discretionary decision mak-
ing by financial statement users. The
survey asked the following questions:
• "How confident are you that the
CPAs are independent in performing
the audit?"
• "How confident are you that the
audited financial statements are free
from unintentional (alternatively, inten-
tional) misstatements or omissions?"
Participants responded on an 11-
point scale ranging from 0 (no confi-
dence) to 10 (extreme confidence).
Finally, loan officers were asked to
make a recommendation to approve or
reject on the loan application.
Results
We examined whether the outsourc-
ing of the internal audit function to the
company's external auditor affected
this group of financial statement users'
perceptions of auditor independence
and financial statement reliability, in
the context of making a loan decision.
The perception of independence was
significantly different across the three
outsourcing arrangements (See
Exhibit). Regarding financial statement
reliability, the intentional misstate-
ments measure was also significantly
different across groups, but the unin-
tentional misstatements response was
only marginally significant. Finally, loan
acceptance rates varied greatly.
These overall results indicate that
loan officers substantially adjust their
perceptions of auditor independence,
the reliability of the financial state
ments, and the loan decision according
to whether the external auditor per-
formed the outsourced internal audit
function. The findings also indicate that
the type of internal audit outsotircing
relationship affects these perceptions
and decisions. We investigated these
findings further in terms of two related
issues:
External auditor involvement
with management functions. Statisti-
cal comparisons revealed that the man-
agement functions group had signifi-
cantly lower ratings of auditor indepen-
dence than the not outsourced group
(p<.05). Furthermore, the management
functions group had the lowest mean
responses to auditor independence
(5.56), unintentional misstatements
(5.93). and intentional misstatements
(6.48) as compared to all of the other
grotips. A significantly lower percent-
age of loan officers granted the loan to
the management functions group (26%)
than the not-outsourced group (50%).
Taken together, these findings indicate
that financial statement users have
decidedly negative reactions when the
external auditor assumes management
functions in the performance of the
outsourced internal audit. These results
support current professional and regu-
latory standards that specifically pro-
hibit auditors from engaging in such
activities.
Staffing of the engagement. The
survey considered two t\ pes of staffing
arrangements within the (.PA firm:
using different personnel or using the
same personnel for external and inter-
nal audits. The data shown in the
Exhibit indicate that these two staffing
arrangements were perceived quite dif-
ferently. Overall, the different person-
nel group had the highest rating of
auditor independence (7.39) and confi-
dence that the financial statements
were free from unintentional and inten-
tional misstatement (7.30 and 8.39) of
all the groups examined. The loan-
granting percentage of the different
personnel group (70%) was marginally
significantly higher (p<.06) than the
same personnel group (45%), and con-
siderably higher than the management
functions group.
These results indicate that loan offi-
cers view the separation of personnel
performing the external and internal
audit very positively. Respondents had
a more positive perception of auditor
independence, financial statement
EXHIBIT
THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION
TO THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR (MEAN RESPONSES TO CASE QUESTIONS)
Group Auditor Financial Statement Loan
Independence Reliability Decisions
Unintentional Intentional
Not outsourced (no)
Outsourced—management
functions (mgf)
Outsourced—same
personnel (sp)
0 utsou reed—d iff erent
personnel (dp)
Significance
Levels
Significant Differences
7.00
5.56
6.23
7.39
.001
no>mgf*
dp>mgf,sp*
no>sp**
6.54
5.93
6.24
7.30
.100
none
7.09
6.48
7.24
8.39
.008
dp> no,mgf,sp*
50%
20%
45%
70%
.021
no,dp>
mgf*
dp>sp**
Scores measured on an 11-point scale from 0 (no confidence) to 10 (extreme
confidence). Loan decisions measured as a percentage of loan officers that
would grant the loan.
*Significantly different at the 0.05 level.
* *Significantly different at the 0.1 level.
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One way to resolve independence per-
ception problems may be to require the
separation of personnel performing tbe
external and internal audit tasks.
integrity, and loan acceptability when
the external audit firm performed
internal audit work but with different
personnel.
Implicaifons
The results of this study provide
important insights into the effects of
various internal audit outsourcing
arrangements. The findings support the
former AICPA position that having out-
sourced internal audit activities per-
formed by the company's external
audit firm does not, by itself, appear to
negatively affect financial statement
users' perceptions of auditor indepen-
dence and other related decisions. This
type of outsourcing arrangement
would be expected to increase in the
future if atidit firms are allowed to pro-
vide these services to their clients.
Wliile the SEC and AICPA have imple-
mented certain constraints regarding
these arrangements, in certain cases
audit firms are still allowed to provide
these services.
Our results also support the AICPA's
current position in Interpretation 101-
13 that if CPAs are associated with an
audit client's internal audit activities
they should not perform management
ftinetions for such a client. Our results
indicate that having external auditors
perform management functions as part
of the outsourced internal audit work
led to the most negative perceptions of
auditor independence and financial
statement reliability, as well as the low-
est loan acceptance rates. Financial
statement users perceived that it was
inappropriate for the external auditors
to both supervise the internal audit
function and make decisions regarding
the implementation of systems
improvements (i.e., management func-
tions).
The results provide support for
internal audit outsourcing if there is a
requirement that CPA firm engage-
ment teams providing internal and
external audits remain distinctly sepa-
rated. The separation of internal and
external audit personnel within the
CPA firm not only minimized potential
independence concerns, but it also
resulted in the most favorable percep-
tions of auditor independence and
financial statement reliability, and the
highest loan acceptance rates. Appar-
ently, respondents looked favorably
upon the external auditor as a
provider of the outsourced internal
audit as long as the same personnel did
not perform both internal and external
audit functions.
These financial statement users may
have perceived some positive synergy
in performing internal audit work for
the external audit client. This dual role
might improve audit quality by provid-
ing external auditors with greater
insight into the client, making it more
likely that business transactions will
be understood and key audit risks
identified. In addition, being engaged
to perform internal audit work for the
audit client may be perceived as a sig-
nal of high quality work. Regardless of
whether performing the internal audit
work leads to a better external audit,
or performing the external audit well
leads to an internal audit engagement,
the loan officers in our study per-
ceived this relationship favorably.
While the AICPA has requested (and
the SEC originally proposed) that CPA
firms should be strictly prohibited
from performing outsourced internal
audits for public attest clients, this
study suggests that external auditors
performing outsourced internal audit
work for clients was not, by itself, per-
ceived negatively. The results also
indicate that one way to resolve inde-
pendence perception problems associ-
ated with performing internal audit
work may be to require the separation
of CPA firm personnel performing the
external and internal audit tasks.
These findings should be of interest to
the AICPA, SEC, and other groups
involved with establishing standards
and regulations. These results, along
with additional research, should aid
the development of practice standards
and a conceptual framework for audi-
tor independence.
These results should be interpreted
within the framework of this study and
its inherent limitations. This study
assessed only those situations where
the external auditor was performing
internal audit work. Auditors often
extend their typical financial statement
audit work at the client's request for
other situations, such as performing a
more detailed investigation of one
operating unit or geographic location,
or the expansion of computer opera-
tions and processing testing. These and
other situations extend the scope of
the external audit and make using sepa-
rate teams impractical. Which of these
services constitute external audit work
and w^hich are internal audit work is
sometimes difficult to determine with
certainty and often requires consider-
able judgment on the part of the audi-
tor. This study did not assess these
hybrid services, even though their cate-
gorizations are now required under the
new SEC audit fee disclosure require-
ments. •
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